Cornell Law Review
Volume 93
Issue 3 March 2008

Article 15

Torturous Consequences and the Case of Maher
Arar: Can Canadian Solutions Cure the Due
Process Deficiencies in U.S. Removal Proceedings
Erin Craddock

Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/clr
Part of the Law Commons
Recommended Citation
Erin Craddock, Torturous Consequences and the Case of Maher Arar: Can Canadian Solutions Cure the Due Process Deficiencies in U.S.
Removal Proceedings, 93 Cornell L. Rev. 621 (2008)
Available at: http://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/clr/vol93/iss3/15

This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Scholarship@Cornell Law: A Digital Repository. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Cornell Law Review by an authorized administrator of Scholarship@Cornell Law: A Digital Repository. For more information, please
contact jmp8@cornell.edu.

NOTE
TORTUROUS CONSEQUENCES AND THE CASE OF
MAHER ARAR: CAN CANADIAN SOLUTIONS "CURE"
THE DUE PROCESS DEFICIENCIES IN U.S.
REMOVAL PROCEEDINGS?
Erin Craddockt
INTRODUCTION .................................................

621

I. LEGAL AND FACTUAL BACKGROUND ......................... 623
A. Legal Background .................................... 623

1. U.S. Law ........................................ 623
2. CanadianLaw ................................... 628
B. Factual Background of the Case of Maher Arar ..... 634
II.

THE APPLICATION OF U.S. AND CANADIAN LAW TO THE

637
A. U.S. Law .............................................. 637
FACTS OFARAR'S CASE ......................................

B.
III.

1. Inadmissibility and the Order of Removal ...........
2. Country of Removal ..............................
3. JudicialReview ...................................
Canadian Law ......................................
1. Inadmissibility and the Order of Removal ...........

637
637
640
646
646

THE PROBLEM WITH UNCHECKED DISCRETION AND A
PROPOSED SOLUTION ...................................... 649

A. The Current Process Afforded ...................... 650
B. The Constitutional Adequacy of the Process
Afforded ........................................... 650
C. A Possible Solution ................................. 653
CONCLUSION ................................................... 657
INTRODUCTION

Aliens have never enjoyed the full protection of the Bill of
Rights.1 Aliens arriving at the U.S. border are entitled to little, if any,
t B.A., University of Toronto, 2005; candidate for J.D., Cornell Law School, 2008;
Symposium Editor, Volume 93, Cornell Law Review. I would like to thank Professor Stephen
W. Yale-Loehr for his insight and guidance, Japneet Bhandal for her patience in explaining
Canadian immigration law, and my family and friends for their support.
1 See Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 78 n.12 (1976) ("The Constitution protects the
privileges and immunities only of citizens .. ");id. at 78 ("[A] host of constitutional and
statutory provisions rest on the premise that a legitimate distinction between citizens and
aliens may justify attributes and benefits for one class not accorded to the other .. ").
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constitutional protection.2 This lack of protection extends to both
substantive and procedural due process rights. 3 However, the level of
constitutional protection afforded to aliens is unclear because of the
Judiciary's willingness to defer to immigration decisions made by the
Executive. 4 This deference has degraded the value of the procedural
5
safeguards enshrined in the Constitution.
Perhaps the most striking illustration of judicial deference to the
Executive in immigration proceedings, even when there are serious
life and liberty interests at stake, is the case of Maher Arar. Arar, a
dual citizen of Canada and Syria, 6 was tortured after the U.S. government removed him to Syria. 7 Former U.S. Attorney General John Ashcroft claimed that the government executed this decision under his
statutory discretion under the Immigration and Nationality Act
(INA).8 This Note will compare the immigration proceedings that
Maher Arar faced in the United States with the Canadian proceedings
Arar would have been subject to had he been a foreign national applying for entrance to Canada. More specifically, this Note will focus on
whether the U.S. Executive9 has too much discretion in immigration
Unless otherwise stated in this Note, the term "alien" refers to a nonresident foreign
national.
2 See Landon v. Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21, 32 (1982).
3
See United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 273 (1990) (explaining that
treating aliens differently from citizens under the Fourth Amendment does not violate the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fifth Amendment).
4 See Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 769-70 (1972); Shaughnessy v. U.S. ex rel.
Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 210 (1953); U.S. ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537, 543
(1950).
5 See United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258, 264 (1967) ("Implicit in the term 'national
defense' is the notion of defending those values and ideals which set this Nation apart.");
Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 244-46 (1944) (Jackson, J., dissenting) (noting
that if the U.S. Supreme Court were to defer to military orders issued by the Executive
when the orders are clearly unconstitutional, the Court would be manipulating the Constitution and validating unconstitutional actions by the Executive).
6
Maher Arar Deportation Order 3 (INS Oct. 7, 2002) (on file with author) [hereinafter Deportation Order].
7
See COMM'N OF INQUIRY INTO THE ACTIONS OF CANADIAN OFFICIALS IN RELATION TO
MAHER ARAR, REPORT OF PROFESSOR STEPHENJ. TooPE: FACT FINDER 15-19 (2005), available

at http://www.ararcommission.ca/eng/ToopeReport-final.pdf.
8 See8 U.S.C. §§ 1103(a)(1), 1225(c)(2)(B), 1231(b) (2) (C) (2000);Ararv. Ashcroft,
414 F. Supp. 2d 250, 271-73 (E.D.N.Y. 2006).
9 On March 31, 2003, the Immigration and Naturalization Service, a division of the
Department of'Justice and thus under the direction of the Attorney General, dissolved and
its functions were transferred to the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). See Homeland Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-296, 116 Stat. 2135. In addition, the Attorney
General delegated much, though not all, of his authority under the INA to the Secretary
for Homeland Security. See Authority of the Secretary of Homeland Security, Delegations
of Authority, Immigration Laws, 68 Fed. Reg. 10,922 (Mar. 6, 2003) (codified at 8 C.F.R.
§§ 1.1(o), 2.1, 103.1, 239.1). However, the INA and the Code of Federal Regulations still
refer to the Attorney General. Thus, it is somewhat unclear who the relevant decision
maker is in many sections of the U.S. Code and Federal Regulations. For the purposes of
this Note, I will refer to the Attorney General as the decision maker for the sake of clarity
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proceedings and whether judicial deference to the Executive Branch
in immigration decisions creates a legal vacuum that ignores the basic
due process rights of persons subject to removal from the United
States. This Note will use Canadian law as a point of comparison for
the discretion of the Executive in removal proceedings.
Part I will provide the background legal and factual information
of Maher Arar's case and the applicable U.S. and Canadian law. Part
II is divided into two subparts: subpart A will detail the U.S. laws that
applied to Arar, and subpart B will explain what Canadian laws would
have applied had Arar applied to enter Canada as a foreign national.
Part III will assess the constitutional adequacy of the current U.S. process for removing aliens based on security grounds, and will propose a
new procedural framework with reference to Canadian removal
proceedings.
I
LEGAL AND FACTUAL BACKGROUND

A.

Legal Background
1.

U.S. Law

An alien may be subject to removal from the United States in two
ways: inadmissibility and deportation. The government deems an
alien inadmissible either upon arrival at the U.S. border or after entry
if the alien entered the United States without a U.S. government official admitting that alien.1 0 An alien may be inadmissible for several
reasons, including on security grounds for being a member of a terrorist organization." An alien is deportable if a U.S. government official admitted that alien to the United States and that individual
subsequently violated the Immigration and Nationality Act. 12
An alien is subject to removal from the United States through
either "normal,"13 "expedited,"14 or "summary" removal proceedings.' 5 In normal removal proceedings, the Department of Homeland
and because when Arar's case occurred it was the Attorney General who would have made
the removal decisions. I will, however, refer to the Department of Homeland Security
when it is clear that the DHS is the relevant decision maker.
10
See THOMAS ALEXANDER ALEINIKOFF ET AL., IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP: PROCESS
AND POLICY 428 (5th ed. 2003).

11
See8 U.S.C. § 1182(a) (3) (B) (i) (V) (Supp. V 2005).
12 See id. § 1227(a) (1) (B); Immigration and Nationality Act, Pub. L. No. 82-414, 66
Stat. 163 (1952) (codified as amended in 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1557 (2000 & Supp. V 2005)).
13 8 U.S.C. § 1229a (2000 & Supp. V 2005).
14 See id. § 1225(b) (2000). The government removes aliens through expedited removal proceedings for certain violations of the Immigration and Nationality Act, such as
misrepresentation. See id. §§ 1182(a) (6) (C), 1225(b) (1) (A) (i). Expedited removal is beyond the scope of this Note.
15
See id. § 1225(c).
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Security (DHS) serves an alien with a document ordering that alien to
appear before an immigration judge (IJ).16 The hearing cannot take
place until at least ten days after service of the order, but it may take
place earlier if the alien so requests. 17 The alien is entitled to counsel,
but the government need not provide counsel at its own expense. 18
The proceeding is similar to a court proceeding: the alien may examine the evidence against him, present his own evidence, and crossexamine agency witnesses. 19 In a normal removal proceeding, the
alien has three options for administrative review. The alien may appeal the decision, 20 file a motion to reconsider the decision, 21 or file a
22
motion to reopen the proceedings.
In contrast, summary removal proceedings involve a truncated
process.2 3 An immigration officer or an IJ may issue a summary removal order if, like Maher Arar, the government considers the alien a
security risk.24 After making such an order, neither the officer nor
the IJ may conduct a hearing unless the Attorney General so instructs. 25 The Attorney General has discretion to request such a hear2 6
ing after reviewing the decision of the immigration officer or the IJ.
If the Attorney General "is satisfied ... that the alien is inadmissible"
on security grounds and, after discussing the case with the relevant
government agencies, "concludes that disclosure of the information
would be prejudicial to the public interest, safety, or security, the Attorney General may order the alien removed without further inquiry
or hearing by an immigration judge." 27 This power is a distinct difference from normal removal proceedings. There is no automatic hearing in summary removal-there is only a limited ability to challenge
either the initial determination by the immigration officer or IJ or the
28
final decision by the Attorney General.

16
17

See id. § 1229(a)(1);

ALEINIKOFF ET AL.,

supra note 10, at 626.

See8 U.S.C. § 1229(b)(1).

18

See id. § 1229a(b) (4) (A).

19

See id. § 1229a(b)(4)(B).

20
21
22

Id. § 1229a(c) (5) (Supp. V 2005).
Id.§ 1229a(c) (6).
Id. § 1229a(c) (7).

23-

Summary removal orders are also rare. See COMM'N OF INQUIRY INTO THE ACTIONS

OF CANADIAN OFFICIALS IN RELATION TO MAHER ARAR, REPORT OF THE EvENTs RELATING TO
MAHER

ARAR

FACTUAL

BACKGROUND

VOLUME

www.ararcommission.ca/eng/Vol-l-English.pdf
BACKGROUND VOLUME

I 207
(2006), available at http://
[hereinafter COMM'N REPORT: FACTUAL

I].

24

8 U.S.C. § 1225(c) (2000); see Deportation Order, supra note 6, at 2.

25
26

See8 U.S.C. § 1225(c)(1)(C).
See id. § 1225(c)(2)(B).

27

See id.

28

See id. § 1252(a) (2) (B) (ii) (Supp. V 2005). While the statute seems to preclude all
judicial review of removal orders of aliens inadmissible on security grounds, in practice the
courts are willing to exercise a basic level of review. See infra notes 188-200 and accompanying text.
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Before determining whether an alien is entitled to judicial review
of his removal order, it is necessary to determine if the alien is entitled
to due process. 29 The Supreme Court has held that aliens who have
not yet entered the United States are entitled to few due process
rights. 30 Lower federal courts have elucidated the scope of these lim-

ited protections. More specifically, the First Circuit has held that arriving aliens have constitutional protection against illegal government
action, such as police officer abuse, but such aliens cannot use these
due process rights to challenge admission or removal procedures. 31
The Fifth and Eleventh Circuits have similarly held that aliens are entitled to basic due process rights. 32 The Eleventh Circuit has stated
that "aliens can raise constitutional challenges to deprivations of liberty... outside the context of entry or admission."3 3 While it is clear
that there is a minimum level of due process for inadmissible aliens, it
is unclear where the outer limit of due process lies. Although the U.S.
Supreme Court has stated that technically, inadmissible aliens can
challenge the constitutionality of the statutory inadmissibility provision applied to them, in reality this challenge almost always fails because the government need only have a "bona fide reason" for the
34
decision.

29 It is important to note that Congress has amended the statutory section that limits
judicial review of immigration decisions since the government removed Maher Arar from
the United States. See REAL ID Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-13, § 106, 119 Stat. 231,
310-11 (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1252 (2000 & Supp. V 2005)). This Note applies the current
statutory section to analyze what would happen if a situation like Arar's were to arise in the
United States today.
30
See U.S. ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537, 544 (1950) ("Whatever the
procedure authorized by Congress is, it is due process as far as an alien denied entry is
concerned.").
31
See Amanullah v. Nelson, 811 F.2d 1, 9 (1st Cir. 1987). That case involved the
consolidated appeals of four Afghans who were detained by the Immigration and Nationalization Service (INS) pending the outcome of exclusion proceedings brought against
them. See id. at 3. They filed habeas petitions with a U.S. district court seeking release
from detention. See id. The petitions were denied. See id. On appeal, the First Circuit
held that while inadmissible aliens are entitled to minimal due process rights, there was no
due process violation in refusing parole to the aliens because their detention was not "unnecessarily prolonged." See id. at 9.
32 See Lynch v. Cannatella, 810 F.2d 1363, 1372-73 (5th Cir. 1987); Jean v. Nelson,
727 F.2d 957, 972 (11th Cir. 1984).
3-3 Jean, 727 F.2d at 972.
34 See, e.g., Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787, 795 n.6 (1977) (holding that Congress could
give preferential status to certain citizens in order to make administration of the permanent resident program easier, even if it may violate the Equal Protection Clause); Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 770 (1972) (holding that the Attorney General has the
discretion to deny an alien entry if the alien has a record of abusing the grounds of his
previous entries, even if First Amendment issues are at stake); Padilla-Padilla v. Gonzales,
463 F.3d 972, 979 (9th Cir. 2006) (holding that the expeditious removal of aliens is a bona
fide reason).
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Statutory language that restricts judicial review of removal orders
further limits arriving aliens' procedural rights. 35 However, the stat-

ute also states that the restrictive clauses shall not be interpreted as
precluding judicial review of constitutional claims or questions of
law. 3 6 Further, while the plain language of the statute limits appeals
of summary removal orders, 37 at least two circuits have refused to interpret the statute so narrowly. 38 Moreover, the Supreme Court has
held that if Congress wants to limit judicial review, its intent to do so
must be clear. 39 Thus, while the scope of review in summary removal
cases is more limited than in normal removal decisions, it does exist,
and historically courts have occasionally refused to defer to the Attor40
ney General's decisions in summary removal proceedings.
Regardless of due process concerns, once the government orders
the alien's removal, the government must select the destination country for removal based on the nature of the alien and the type of removal proceeding. 4 1 If an arriving alien is subject to normal removal
proceedings, the government should remove the alien to the country
from which he arrived unless that country will not accept him or the
42
country is contiguous to the United States.
35

See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a) (2), (b)(9), (g) (Supp. V 2005).

36 Id. § 1252(a) (2) (D).
37 See id.; id. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii) ("[N]o court shall have jurisdiction to review ...
any.., decision or action of the Attorney General... the authority for which is specified
under this subchapter to be in

the discretion of the Attorney General . . . ."); id.

§ 1252(b) (9) (providing that there can only be judicial review of a final removal order); id.
§ 1252(g) (establishing that no court shall have jurisdiction to hear any case by an alien
that arises from an "action by the Attorney General to commence proceedings, adjudicate
cases, or execute removal orders").
38
SeeAlsamhouri v. Gonzales, 484 F.3d 117, 122 (1st Cir. 2007) (finding that 8 U.S.C.
§ 1252(a) (2) (B) (ii) only precludes review of decisions that are explicitly specified to be
within the Attorney General's discretion); Kwai Fun Wong v. United States, 373 F.3d 952,
963 (9th Cir. 2004) (noting that the statute cannot bar constitutional claims because it is
not within the Attorney General's discretion to violate the Constitution).
39 See Webster v. Doe, 486 U.S. 592, 599-600 (1988).
40
See, e.g., Rafeedie v. INS, 880 F.2d 506, 510-13 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (holding that permanent resident aliens who were inadmissible for being suspected terrorists could seek
review of their summary removal order); Azzouka v. Meese, 820 F.2d 585, 587 (2d Cir.
1987) (holding that a summary removal order is subject to limited judicial review, namely
"'that the Government acted on a facially legitimate and bona fide reason'" and refusing
to grant the alien's habeas petition on this basis (quoting El-Werfali v. Smith, 547 F. Supp.
152, 153 (S.D.N.Y. 1982)). It should be noted that both cases deal with the former 8 U.S.C.
§ 1255(c); there are few, if any, removal cases under the current section. See COMM'N REPORT: FACTUAL BACKGROUND VOLUME I, supra note 23, at 207.
41
See8 U.S.C. § 1231(b) (2000 & Supp. V 2005).
42
See id. § 1231(b) (1) (A) (2000). If an alien arrives from a country contiguous to the
United States and is not a citizen or national of that country, the government shall remove
the alien to the country he was in before arriving in the contiguous country. See id.
§ 1231(b)(1)(B). If neither the country from which the alien arrived, nor the contiguous
country will accept the alien, the government may remove the alien to a country of which
the alien is a citizen or national, the alien's birth country, the country where the alien
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"Other aliens," presumably those not arriving in the United States
and those not subject to normal removal proceedings, undergo a different country selection process. 43 Although "other aliens" may designate a country for removal, the Attorney General may disregard an
alien's designation if: (1) the alien fails to designate a country within
the allowed statutory time; (2) within thirty days of notification of the
alien's designated country, the government of the alien's designated
country does not tell the Attorney General whether it will accept the
alien; (3) the government of the alien's designated country is unwilling to accept the alien; or (4) "the Attorney General decides that removing the alien to the country is prejudicial to the United States." 44
The Supreme Court has recognized that if the alien is a citizen of the
removal country and if he was convicted of a crime in that country, it
would prejudice the United States not to remove the alien to that
45
country.
However, U.S. law does not permit the Attorney General to order
an alien removed to a country where the alien's life or freedom would
be threatened. 46 This is an important limitation on both the selection
process itself and the Attorney General's discretion to select countries
for removal. Congress enshrined this policy, called nonrefoulement,
in U.S. law by passing the Foreign Affairs Reform and Restructuring
Act (FARRA) in 1998. 4 7 FARRA prohibits the United States from

sending an alien, against his will, to a country where "there are substantial grounds for believing the [alien] would be in danger of being
subjected to torture, regardless of whether the [alien] is physically
present in the United States." 48 Federal regulations do not make exceptions to nonrefoulement-8 C.F.R. § 235.8(b) (3) provides that the
INS may not execute a removal order under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(c) if the
removal would violate nonrefoulement. 4 9 The procedure to determine whether an alien would be subject to torture in the proposed
resides, or any other country that is willing to accept the alien if removal to the previous
three countries is "impracticable, inadvisable, or impossible." See id. § 1231 (b) (1) (C).
43
See id.§ 1231(b)(2).
44
See id.§ 1231(b)(2)(C).
45
See INS v. Doherty, 502 U.S. 314, 320 (1992).
46
See 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3) (2000 & Supp. V 2005).
47
See Foreign Affairs Reform and Restructuring Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-277,
§ 2242, 112 Stat. 2681, 2681-822; STEPHEN W. YALE-LOEHR & JEFFREY C. O'NEILL, THE LEGALITY OF MAHER ARAR'S TREATMENT UNDER U.S. IMMIGRATION LAW, SUBMISSION TO THE
COMMISSION OF INQUIRY INTO THE ACTIONS OF CANADIAN OFFICIALS IN RELATION TO MAHER
ARAR 3 (2005), http://www.ararcommission.ca/eng/Yale-Loehr-mayl6.pdf.
48
See § 2242, 112 Stat. at 2681-822. The last part of the clause ("regardless of
whether the person is physically present in the United States") is important because the
government does not consider arriving aliens to be on U.S. soil. See Shaughnessy v. U.S. ex
rel.
Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 213, 215 (1953).
49
See 8 C.F.R. § 235.8(b)(4) (2007); YALE-LOEHR & O'NEILL, supra note 47, at 8.
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country of removal depends upon the nature of the removal
50
proceeding.
In summary removal, the Attorney General cannot send an alien
to a country where the Attorney General determines that the alien's
life would be threatened. 5 1 However, the Attorney General can ask
the Secretary of State to seek assurances from the proposed removal
country that the alien will not be subject to torture or inhumane treatment.52 The Attorney General and the Secretary of State will then
determine if these assurances are "sufficiently reliable" to remove the
alien "to that country consistent with [the United Nations Convention
Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment
or Punishment]."53 If they decide that the assurances are reliable,
neither an IJnor the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) can review
this decision, 5 4 and the U.S. government may remove the alien to that
country.
Thus, the Attorney General is left to interpret removal law with
only limited oversight from the judiciary. Further, courts have exercised this limited check on the Attorney General sparingly, 55 thus subjecting immigration law, and more specifically summary removal
proceedings, to abuse.
2.

CanadianLaw

The Canadian government may remove a foreign national 56 from
Canada if the government deems that national inadmissible. 57 The
government may deem a foreign national inadmissible on several
grounds, including criminality and security. 58 Regardless of their legal status, Canada removes all foreign nationals under the same provisions of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act (IRPA). 59 In
most cases, except for serious criminality and security grounds, once
an immigration officer decides that a foreign national is inadmissible,
the officer writes a report outlining both the inadmissibility section
50

See YALE-LOEHR & O'NEILL, supra note 47, at 4-5.

51

See8 U.S.C. § 1231 (b) (3)(A) (2000).

52

See YALE-LoEHR & O'NEILL, supra note 47, at 9.

53 8 C.F.R. § 208.18(c) (2); seeYALE-LOEHR & O'NEILL, supra note 47, at 10.
54 See 8 C.F.R. § 208.18(c) (3); YALE-LoEHR & O'NEILL, supra note 47, at 10.
55 See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
56 The Immigration and Refugee Protection Act (IRPA) refers to foreign nationals
where the United States Code would refer to nonresident aliens. The meanings of the two
terms are identical for the purposes of this Note.
57 See generally Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, 2001 S.C., ch. 27, §§ 34-42
(Can.) (describing the grounds for inadmissibility).
58

See id.

59 See id. § 44. This is in contrast to U.S. removal proceedings in which an alien's
status in the United States determines the applicable removal procedure. See supra text
accompanying notes 10-12.
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applicable to the foreign national and the reasons for inadmissibility.6° The officer then refers the report to the Minister of Citizenship
and Immigration Canada (CIG) (or her delegate), who then decides
whether or not to initiate removal proceedings. 6 1 If the Minister de-

cides to proceed, a Member of the Immigration Division of the Immigration and Refugee Board (Board) holds a hearing, and the foreign
62
national may appeal an adverse decision to a federal court.
However, if a foreign national is inadmissible on security
grounds, the Minister may choose an alternate removal procedure instead of an admissibility hearing. In this situation, an immigration
officer must contact the Security Review at the National Security Division of Canada Border Services Agency (CBSA) for approval before
refusing the foreign national entry to Canada or writing an inadmissibility report. 63 If CBSA approves, the immigration officer (or CBSA)
then writes an inadmissibility report and forwards the report to the
Minister of CIC. 64 The Ministers of Public Safety (PS) and CIC 65 then
decide how to proceed. 66 If the Ministers decide that the report is
well-founded, the Ministers have two procedural options: (1) the Minister of CIC may refer the foreign national for an admissibility hearing
before a Member of the Board because the Minister believes the foreign national is inadmissible; 67 or (2) the Ministers may remove the
68
foreign national through a security certificate.
If the Ministers decide to remove a foreign national through an
admissibility hearing, the foreign national has a right to counsel,
though the government need not provide one. 6 9 For the right to
counsel to be meaningful, not only must the Member of the Board
allow enough time for the foreign national to retain counsel, but the
See Immigration and Refugee Protection Act § 44(1).
61
See id. § 44(2).
62 See id. §§ 44(2), 72. The foreign national may also appeal an adverse decision to
the Board if he is a "protected person" under IRPA. See id. § 63(3). A foreign national is a
protected person if the Minister of CIC has approved his PRRA application. See id.
60

§ 112(1).
63
See CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION CAN., ENFORCEMENT MANUAL, ENF 5: WRITING 44(1)
REPORTS 10 (2007), available at http://www.cic.gc.ca/english/resources/manuals/enf/
enf05e.pdf [hereinafter ENFORCEMENT MANUAL, WRITING 44(1) REPORTS].
64 See Immigration and Refugee Protection Act § 44(1).
65 Public Safety Canada includes several Canadian government agencies including
CBSA. See Canada Border Services Agency, Who We Are, http://www.cbsa.gc.ca/agencyagence/who-qui-eng.html (last visited Jan. 23, 2008).
66
See ENFORCEMENT MANUAL, WRITING 44(1) REPORTS, supra note 63, at 8-10.
67 See Immigration and Refugee Protection Act § 44(2).
68
See id. § 77. Note that parts of the Canadian Security Certificate process may
change in the coming year because the Canadian Supreme Court ruled in 2007 that portions of the procedure are unconstitutional. See Charkaoui v. Canada (Citizenship & Immigration), [2007] 1 S.C.R. 350, 2007 SCC 9, para. 3 (Can.); infra notes 92-94 and
accompanying text.
69 See Immigration and Refugee Protection Act § 167(1).
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Member must provide enough time for counsel to prepare the case.7 0
The proceeding is quasi-judicial in nature because, while formal evidence rules do not apply, 7 1 both the government and the foreign national may present evidence. 72 Further, the hearing will be public
unless the foreign national makes a confidentiality application or the
Board decides to conduct the hearing in private.7 3 At the end of the
hearing, the Member must either decide that the foreign national is
admissible or order the foreign national removed because he is inadmissible.7 4 If the Member deems the foreign national inadmissible on
security grounds, the foreign national may appeal the decision to a
federal court but not to the Board unless the foreign national is a
protected person.7 5 However, there is no right to appeal, and it is only
granted with leave of the federal court. 7 6 Further, if the appeal is

granted, the level of review is deferential and the court will only overturn the Member's decision if it is "patently unreasonable" because
the Member made it arbitrarily or in bad faith, or because the deci77
sion was unsupported by the evidence.
However, before or during the admissibility hearing, an eligible
foreign national may apply for a Pre-Removal Risk Assessment
(PRRA).Y8 A PRRA application is filed if a foreign national fears torture or prosecution if returned to his country of citizenship, birth
country, or the country from which the foreign national arrived. 79
The foreign national must submit the application to the Minister of
CIC for review.8 0 In evaluating whether a foreign national is in need
of protection, the Minister must decide whether removing the foreign
national to his country or countries of nationality would subject him
to a danger "believed on substantial grounds to exist," pose a threat to
the foreign national's life, or present "a risk of cruel and unusual
treatment or punishment. 8 1 The Minister must also consider
70

See LORNE WALDMAN, 2004 CANADIAN IMMIGRATION

&

REFUGEE LAW PRACTICE 103

(2003).
71
See Immigration and Refugee Protection Act § 162(2) ("Each Division shall deal
with all proceedings before it as informally and quickly as the circumstances and the considerations of fairness and natural justice permit.").
72

See WALDMAN, supra note 70, at 105.

73
74
75

See Immigration and Refugee Protection Act § 166.
See id. § 45.
See id. §§ 63(3), 72(1).
76
See Bains v. Canada (Minister of Employment & Immigration), [1990] 109 N.R.
239, para. 4 (Can.).
77
See Suresh v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship & Immigration), [2002] 1 S.C.R. 3,
2002 SCC 1, para. 29 (Can.).
78 See Immigration and Refugee Protection Act § 112(1).
79
See id. §§ 97, 113(d). For a full discussion of the PRRA process, see CITIZENSHIP &
IMMIGRATION CAN., ENFORCEMENT MANUAL, ENF 10: REMOVALS (2006), available at http://

www.cic.gc.ca/english/resources/manuals/enf/enfl Oe.pdf.
80
See Immigration and Refugee Protection Act § 112(1).
81
See id.§§ 97(1)(a)-(b), 113(d).
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whether to refuse the application because the foreign national
presents a danger to Canada's security.8 2 In considering whether to
grant a PRRA application, the Minister of CIC, like the Secretary of
State in U.S. removal proceedings, may seek assurances from the
country to which Canada is considering removing a foreign national
that the foreign national would be safe from torture if Canada returned that individual to the removal country.8 3 In determining the
reasonableness of the assurances, the Canadian Supreme Court has
held that it is difficult to rely "too heavily on assurances by a state that
it will refrain from torture in the future when it has engaged in illegal
'84
torture or allowed others to do so on its territory in the past.
If the Minister grants a PRRA, and the Minister decides that a
foreign national is in need of protection, this, in effect, stays his removal, s5 and the government cannot remove the foreign national unless the conditions in his country of removal change such that it is
unlikely the foreign national would be tortured if he returned. 86
However, if the Minister decides that there is no such risk, the government may remove a foreign national if the Member deems him inadmissible. However, even if the Minister believes that such a risk exists,
the Minister has discretion to deny the PRRA upon the belief that the
foreign national is a danger to Canada's security. 87 However, such a
case must be an exceptional one.8 8
If, instead of referring the foreign national to an admissibility
hearing, the Ministers of CIC and PS issue a security certificate, they
must follow a strict process. First, the Ministers must agree that a foreign national is inadmissible on security grounds and then sign a certificate to that effect.8 9 Once signed, the Ministers refer the certificate
to a chief justice, or a designated judge, of a federal court who determines the reasonableness of the certificate. 90
In reviewing the reasonableness of the security certificate, the
federal judge, using a less stringent standard than the balance of
probabilities, reviews all evidence that the Ministers submitted. 9 1 The
primary reason for using the security certificate process is that the government has highly sensitive information that it does not want made
See id. § 113(d) (ii).
See Suresh v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship & Immigration), [2002] 1 S.C.R. 3,
2002 SCC 1, para. 123 (Cai.).
84
See id. at para. 124.
85
See Immigration and Refugee Protection Act § 114(1)(b).
86
See id. § 114(2).
87
See id. § 115(2).
88
See Suresh, I S.C.R. at para. 129.
89 See Immigration and Refugee Protection Act § 77(1).
90
See id. §§ 77(1), 80(1).
91
See Colleen Bell, Subject to Exception: Security Certificates, National Security and Canada's
Role in the "War on Terror," 21 CAN. J.L. & Soc'y 63, 72 (2006).
82
83
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public. Before February 2007, this process allowed the Minister of PS
to request that the judge hear all or part of the evidence in camera
without the foreign national or his counsel present. 9 2 However, in
February 2007, the Canadian Supreme Court ruled that such a "secret" proceeding is unconstitutional because it violates section 7 of the
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.9 3 Thus, it is unlikely that
this part of the process will survive Parliament's amendment of the
94
IRPA pursuant to the Court's opinion.
Once the government has presented its case, the foreign national
is entitled to present his case.9 5 The judge may receive any relevant
evidence, even if it would be inadmissible "in a court of law." 96 The
foreign national is also entitled to counsel, though the government
need not provide for one. 9 7 During the security certificate proceeding, but before a judge renders a final decision, a foreign national
may apply for a PRRA. 98 Once the foreign national applies, the security certificate proceeding ceases and the judge must submit the PRRA
to the Minister of CIC for review.9 9 Even if the Minister believes that
the foreign national will be tortured when removed, the Minister does
not have to grant the PRRA if she believes that the foreign national is
a danger to Canadian national security. 100 Once the Minister decides
to grant or deny the PRRA, the certificate process resumes and the
federal judge "shall review the lawfulness of the [Minister's]
decision." 0 1
After hearing all of the evidence, the federal judge must decide
the reasonableness of the security certificate. 10 2 If the judge finds it
reasonable, the certificate becomes an effective order of deportation
92 See Immigration and Refugee Protection Act § 78(e); Benjamin L. Berger, Our
Evolving Judicature: Security Certificates, Detention Review, and the Federal Court, 39 U.B.C. L.
REv. 101, 107 (2006).
93 See Charkaoui v. Canada (Citizenship & Immigration), [2007] 1 S.C.R. 350, 2007
SCC 9, para. 3 (Can.). The Court also ruled that the government violated the Charter by
detaining foreign nationals for 120 days before allowing them to challenge the certificate.
See id. at paras. 3, 141. This part of the Charkaouiopinion is beyond the scope of this Note.
94 The Court has given the Canadian government one year to rewrite this portion of
the IRPA. See id. at para. 140.
95 See Immigration and Refugee Protection Act § 78(i).
96 See id. § 780).
97 See id. § 167(1).
98 See id. §§ 79(1), 112(1); supra notes 78-88 and accompanying text.
99 See Immigration and Refugee Protection Act § 79(1).
100 See id. § 115(2) (b). However, except in exceptional cases, it may violate section 7
of the Charter. See Suresh v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship & Immigration), [2002] 1
S.C.R. 3, 2002 SCC 1, para. 129 (Can.).
101
See Immigration and Refugee Protection Act §§ 79(2), 80(1); Marianne "Chuck"
Davies, UnequalProtection Under the Law: Re Charkaoui and the Security CertificateProcess Under
the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, 69 SASK. L. REv. 375, 382 n.48 (2006).
102 See Immigration and Refugee Protection Act § 80(1).
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10 3
that cannot be appealed to either the Board or to a federal court.
The judge shall quash the certificate if the judge finds it to be unreasonable. 10 4 If the foreign national applied for protection and the
judge determines that the Minister of CIC unlawfully denied the protection, the judge "shall quash the decision and suspend the proceeding to allow the Minister to make a decision on the application for

protection.

1

05

Although the Minister of CIC may use the security certificate proceedings, use of a security certificate is unlikely. While Canada
removes approximately nine thousand persons a year, only twentyseven security certificates have been issued since 1991.106 Further,
given the Canadian Supreme Court's recent ruling on security certificate proceedings and the resulting uncertainty surrounding those
proceedings, the Canadian government is unlikely to use this process
10 7
in the near future.
Regardless of the process the Minister chooses, once the removal
order becomes final "it must be enforced as soon as is reasonably practicable" and the foreign national must leave Canada as quickly as possible.1 08 If a foreign national is inadmissible on security grounds, the
order is effective the day it is issued if the foreign national has not
been granted leave to appeal the order. 10 9 If the foreign national has
the right to appeal and does not exercise it, the order becomes effective when the appeal period expires. 11 0 If the foreign national does
appeal, the order becomes effective on the date of the final determination of the appeal."' The foreign national may then either leave
voluntarily, or the Minister of CIC will enforce the order. 1 12 However,
a foreign national may withdraw his application to enter Canada
before the Minister issues an inadmissibility report. 113 Foreign nation114
als who leave voluntarily may choose their country of removal.
However, the immigration officer may ignore this choice if the officer
determines that the foreign national is "(a) a danger to the public; (b)
a fugitive from justice in Canada or another country; or (c) [is] seek103
See id. §§ 80(3), 81(b).
104 See id. § 80(2).
105
See id.
106
See Public Safety Canada, Security Certificates, http://www.psepc.gc.ca/prg/ns/
seccert-en.asp (last visited Jan. 24, 2008). Of these twenty-seven certificates, only six have
been issued since September 11, 2001. See id.
107
See Charkaoui v. Canada (Citizenship & Immigration), [2007] 1 S.C.R. 350, 2007
SCC 9, para. 140 (Can.).
108 See Immigration and Refugee Protection Act § 48(2).
109 See id. § 49(1)(a).
110 Id.§ 49(1)(b).
Id. § 49(1)(c).
111
112 See Immigration and Refugee Protection Regulations SOR/2002-227, § 237 (Can.).
113 See id. § 42(1).
114 See id. § 238(2).
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ing to evade or frustrate the cause of justice in Canada or another
1 15

country."

If, however, a foreign national does not leave Canada voluntarily
either because that individual refuses to leave or because the immigration officer believes the foreign national is a danger to the public, the
government must remove the foreign national to (1) the country from
which he arrived; (2) the country where he last permanently resided;
(3) his country of citizenship or nationality; or (4) his birth country. 11 6 If none of these countries is willing to accept the foreign national, the Minister must remove the foreign national to any other
17
willing country the Minister chooses.'
Thus, under Canadian law an inadmissible foreign national has
many opportunities to seek judicial review of both the admissibility
decision and the country to which he will be removed. The extensiveness of this review under Canadian law is in stark contrast to the inability of aliens to appeal the same decisions in U.S. courts.
B.

Factual Background of the Case of Maher Ararl 18

Maher Arar is a dual citizen of Canada and Syria.' 19 He traveled
to the United States from Switzerland on September 26, 2002.120 At
the U.S. border, Arar presented a Canadian passport and stated that
he was seeking transit through, and not admission to, the United
States to Canada. 121 The Immigration and Naturalization Service
(INS) had prior notice of his impending arrival and detained him for
questioning. 22 INS officials questioned Arar based on information
received from Canadian authorities. 123 In fact, former U.S. Secretary
of State Colin Powell stated that the United States would not have
115
See id. The foreign national must also satisfy the officer that he has the necessary
means to leave Canada and enter his designated country. See id. § 238(1) (a). He must also
present himself to an officer at a port of entry to "verify [his] departure ... [and] obtain [ ]
a certificate of departure from [CIC]." Id. § 240(1) (a)-(b); see id. § 238(1) (b).
116
See id. § 241(1).
117
See id. § 241(2).
118
Most of the facts in this subpart come from the Canadian commission appointed to
investigate Maher Arar's case because the U.S. government has refused to release
documents relating to Arar's time in the United States. See COMM'N OF INQUIRY INTO THE
ACTIONS OF CANADIAN

OFFICIALS IN RELATION TO MAHER ARAR, REPORT OF THE EvENTS

RELATING TO MAHER ARAR: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 11

www.ararcommission.ca/eng/AREnglish.pdf [hereinafter

(2006), available at http://

ARAR COMM'N REPORT: ANALYSIS

AND RECOMMENDATIONS].

119

See Deportation Order, supra note 6, at 3.
Id.
121
See id.
122
See Arar v. Ashcroft, 414 F. Supp. 2d 250, 253 (E.D.N.Y. 2006); Deportation Order,
supra note 6, at 3.
123
See ARAR COMM'N REPORT: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 118, at 161.
120
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detained Arar but for the information that U.S. authorities had re124
ceived from their Canadian counterparts.
Arar was not allowed to contact a lawyer at any point during his
two days of questioning. 125 In fact, Arar did not receive access to
counsel until October 5,126 nine days after the INS had detained him
and three days before the government removed him to Syria. The
INS deemed Arar inadmissible to the United States because he was
allegedly a member of the terrorist organization al-Qaeda.127 Although U.S. officials gave Arar the opportunity to voluntarily depart
from the United States to Syria, he requested to be removed to Canada and expressed fears of being tortured if he was removed to
28
Syria. 1
Officials detained Arar for five days before informing him that he
would be subject to summary removal. 129 On October 1, the INS
served Arar with the unclassified documents that supplied the basis
for his inadmissibility and gave him five days to respond to the inadmissibility charge. 130 According to the INS, by October 7, Arar had
not provided a written response to its charges; 13 1 the INS served Arar
with the order to remove him to Syria on October 8.132
Evidently, the INS believed that removing Aar to Syria would not
violate FARRA. The INS Commissioner was satisfied that Arar would
not be tortured once removed apparently because Syrian officials assured the Commissioner to that effect. 13 3 However, a 2002 U.S. State
Department report on Syria indicated that Syrian authorities engaged
in torture and were more likely to do so when they were trying to elicit
a confession or information from a detainee. 134 This behavior directly
13 5
contravenes U.S. law.

125

See id.
Arar, 414 F. Supp. 2d at 253.

126

See ARAR COMM'N REPORT: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS,

124

supra note 118, at

167-68.
127
See Arar, 414 F. Supp. 2d at 253.
128

See id. Arar feared he would be tortured in Syria because he had left Syria before

fulfilling his military service requirement and the Syrian government had accused one of
his family members of being a member of a terrorist organization. See YALE-LOEHR &
O'NEILL, supra note 47, at 10.

129

See Deportation Order, supra note 6, at 3.

130
131
132

See id.
See id. at 4.
See id. at 9; ARAR COMM'N REPORT: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 118,

at 139.
133
134

See ARAR COMM'N REPORT: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 118, at 156.
See BUREAU OF DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS, AND LABOR, U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, SYRIA:

COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRAcrICES-2002 (2003), available at http://
www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2002/18289.htm [hereinafter SYRIA: COUNTRY REPORTS ON
HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES].

135

See 18 U.S.C. §§ 2340-2340A (2000); SYRIA: COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS

PRACTICES, supra note 134.
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Syria detained and tortured Arar for nearly one year before releasing and returning him to Canada. 13 6 He was never charged with
any crime. 137 In fact, before removing Arar to Syria, the U.S. Federal
Bureau of Investigation (FBI) told Canadian authorities that it lacked
the necessary evidence to charge Arar and asked Canadian authorities
whether they had sufficient evidence to charge him. 138
After returning to Canada, Arar brought a civil suit in the U.S.
District Court for the Eastern District of New York against former U.S.
Attorney General John Ashcroft, seeking relief under the Due Process
Clause of the Fifth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution and under
the Torture Victim Prevention Act. 139 Aar lost in the district court,
and the Second Circuit has heard his appeal, 140 but as of February 17,
2008, the decision was still pending. Arar also asked the Canadian
government to conduct an official inquiry into its involvement in his
case.' 4 ' The Canadian government established a commission in 2004,
and in September 2006 the commission issued its final report. 142 After the report was issued, both the Canadian House of Commons and
the former Royal Canadian Mounted Police Commissioner formally
apologized to Arar. 143 However, while the United States and Canada
have entered into an agreement aimed at preventing similar situations
in the future, 144 the U.S. Executive Branch has yet to apologize to
145
Aar for subjecting him to torture in Syria.

136

See ARAR

COMM'N REPORT: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note

118, at 9,

139.
137

138

See id. at 9.

See id. at 152. The Canadian authorities reported that they too lacked sufficient
evidence to charge Arar in Canada. Id.
139 Arar v. Ashcroft, 414 F. Supp. 2d 250, 252 (E.D.N.Y. 2006).
140 See Alan Feuer, U.S. Judge QuestionsLawyers on Suit by Tortured Canadian,N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 10, 2007, at A7.
141
See Graham Fraser, Arar's Syrian Hell: 'I Lived in a Grave, TORONTO STAR, Nov. 5,
2003, at Al.
142 See Press Release, Comm'n of Inquiry into the Actions of Canadian Officials in Relation to Maher Arar, Arar Commission Releases Its Findings on the Handling of the
Maher Arar Case (Sept. 18, 2006), available at http://www.ararcommission.ca/eng/
ReleaseFinalSeptl8.pdf. For the commission's recommendations and conclusions, see
generally ARAR COMM'N REPORT: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 118.
143 See Les Whittington, No U.S. Apology in Works forArar,TOROrrro STAR,Oct. 31, 2006,
at A10.
144 The agreement, the Monterey Accord, requires the U.S. government to consult
with the Canadian government before the United States deports a Canadian to a third
country. SeeJim Brown, No Regrets over Arar: U.S. Envoy, TORON'To STAR, Sept. 19, 2005, at
A8.
145 See Whittington, supra note 143, at AlO. There has been no apology even though
U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice acknowledged that the U.S. government "mishandled" Arar's case. See RiceAdmits U.S. Erred in Deportation,N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 25, 2007, at A10.

20081

TORTUROUS CONSEQUENCES
II
THE APPLICATION OF U.S. AND CANADIAN LAW TO THE
FACTS OF ARAR'S CASE

A.

U.S. Law
1. Inadmissibility and the Order of Removal

The U.S. government deemed Arar inadmissible on security
grounds for allegedly being a member of al-Qaeda.1 46 The INS removed Aar from the United States under the summary removal process 1 47 after detaining him for twelve days. Because Aar was subject
to summary removal at the U.S. border, it is likely that an immigration
officer made his inadmissibility determination and a regional director
of the INS ordered him removed.1 48 Aar was allowed to review only
unclassified information, which consisted mainly of his passport, his
reasons for travel, and his alleged association with a person of interest
to Canadian and U.S. authorities.1 49 Aar was not entitled to crossexamine witnesses or file an appeal with a U.S. court to determine the
legality and constitutionality of his removal order. 150 In essence, the
U.S. government summarily deemed Aar a terrorist and never allowed him to challenge that determination.
2.

Country of Removal

While U.S. courts have seldom allowed nonresident aliens to challenge their admissibility to the United States, 15 1 they have allowed
aliens to challenge the country to which the United States may remove them. 152 Although two sections of the U.S. Code govern the
selection process of a country to which the United States may remove
a nonresident alien, 15 3 it is unclear which section the United States
used to select a country of removal for Arar because the U.S. government has been unwilling to release the pertinent documents. 154 In
Arar's civil suit, however, former U.S. Attorney General John Ashcroft
146 See Deportation Order, supra note 6, at 2.
147 See 8 U.S.C. § 1225(c) (2000).
148 See id. § 1225(c)(1); Deportation Order, supra note 6, at 2.
149 See Deportation Order, supra note 6, at 3-5.
150 See 8 U.S.C. § 1225(c)(1) (C) (2000); ARAR COMM'N REPORT: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 118, at 154.
151 See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
152 See generally Jama v. Immigration & Customs Enforcement, 543 U.S. 335 (2005)
(holding that while aliens could challenge Somalia as their country of removal because no
government existed there to "accept" them, the U.S. could remove aliens to Somalia without the consent of the Somalian government); Wangchuck v. Dep't of Homeland Sec., 448
F.3d 524 (2d Cir. 2006) (finding that the BIA erred in allowing petitioner's removal to
China because the BIA did not establish that he was indeed a citizen of China and because
the petitioner did not ask the United States to remove him to China).
153 See supra notes 41-53 and accompanying text.
154 See supra note 118.
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filed a memo stating that the country for Arar's removal was determined under the provision for "other aliens." 155 As Arar was removed
under this section, 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b) (2), the Attorney General was
free to disregard Arar's designation of Canada as his removal country1 56 if the Attorney General thought removing Arar to Canada would
prejudice the United States.1 57 This is the only way that the INS could
have removed Arar to Syria.
U.S. immigration law provides four ways that the Attorney General could have ignored Arar's designated country of removal: (1)
Arar failed to designate a country for removal in a timely fashion; (2)
the country Arar designated did not inform the Attorney General
within thirty days that it would accept him; (3) the designated country
was not willing to accept him; or (4) removing Arar to his designated
country would have prejudiced the United States. 158 Presumably Arar
notified U.S. authorities of his designated country in a timely fashion:
he told them he wanted to be removed to Canada or Switzerland the
day after being detained. 159 Canadian authorities informed the FBI
that they would accept Aar when the FBI inquired. 160 Thus, Canada
likely provided a timely answer under the statute, and the Attorney
General could not ignore Arar's selection under the second and third
options. 16 1 The Attorney General could only have ignored Arar's designation of Canada or Switzerland if he deemed removal to either of
those two countries prejudicial to the United States.' 62 The prejudice
that Arar's removal to Canada might have caused remains unclear
given that Canada issued the intelligence report upon which he was
detained and subsequently removed. It is also unclear what prejudice
there could be in removing Arar to Switzerland, the country from
16 3
which he arrived.
Further, Arar's removal to Syria is peculiar given that in INS v.
Doherty, the Supreme Court held that where the respondent was
charged with a crime in England, it would be prejudicial to remove
him to any country other than England. 1 64 If Canada gave the United
States the information on which the U.S. government detained and
155
156
157
158

See Arar v. Ashcroft, 414 F. Supp. 2d 250, 271 (E.D.N.Y. 2006); supra notes 41-45.
See Arar, 414 F. Supp. 2d at 271.
See 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(2)(C)(iv) (2000); Arar, 414 F. Supp. 2d at 271.
See8 U.S.C. § 1231 (b) (2) (C).

See Arar, 414 F. Supp. 2d at 253.
See ARAR COMM'N REPORT: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 118, at 152.
This assumes that the FBI told the U.S. Attorney General that Canada would accept
161
Arar. The Arar Commission Report and Arar's civil suit do not make clear whether the FBI
did so.
162
See 8 U.S.C. § 1231 (b) (2) (C) (iv).
163
See Deportation Order, supra note 6, at 3.
164
502 U.S. 314, 320 (1992).
159

160
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removed Arar,'1 6 5 and Canadian authorities suspected Arar of terrorist
ties, t 66 under Doherty it should have been prejudicial to remove Arar to
any country other than Canada.
Even if Arar's removal to Canada would have prejudiced the
United States, case law suggests that the United States should not have
considered Arar a Syrian citizen.' 67 While Arar is a dual citizen of
Syria and Canada, under the United States' "dual nationality policy,"
the United States should have treated him as a Canadian citizen.
Under this policy, the "operative" nationality of a dual national is the
nationality he claims when entering the United States-that is, the
passport the alien presents when seeking admission to the United
States. 168 Thus, the Attorney General cannot claim that he was returning Arar to the country of his citizenship because under U.S. law
the government should not have considered him a Syrian citizen. 169
Consequently, the INS could only have removed Aar to Syria if the
Attorney General thought it was prejudicial to the interests of the
United States to remove him to Switzerland or Canada. If it was prejudicial to remove him to the country of his citizenship, and the country
that issued the intelligence information, there must have been a very
strong U.S. national interest at stake. Though any proposed reason is
merely speculation, it is possible that Arar was removed under a policy
of extraordinary rendition. 70 The Central Intelligence Agency uses
the term "extraordinary rendition" to describe the practice of sending
suspected terrorists to foreign countries to be interrogated with methods that would violate U.S. law if used by U.S. officials.1 71 Not only has
Arar argued that this is why he was removed to Syria, 172 but a member
of the U.S. House of Representatives, Edward J. Markey of Massachusetts, has stated that Arar was sent to Syria, and not to Canada, because
73
Syria engages in torture.'
Regardless of whether the United States actually removed Arar to
Syria under a policy of extraordinary rendition, under U.S. law, the
165
166
167
168
169
170

See ARAR COMM'N REPORT: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 118, at 161.
See id. at 86.
SeeJang v. Reno, 113 F.3d 1074, 1076 (9th Cir. 1997).
See id.
See id.
See COMM'N OF INQUIRY INTO THE ACTIONS OF CANADIAN OFFICIALS IN RELATION TO

MAHER ARAR, REPORT OF THE EVENTS RELATING TO MAHER ARAR,
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I: ADDENDUM 245 (2006), available at http://www.ararcommission.ca/eng/200708-08-addendum.pdf; Jane Mayer, Outsourcing Torture, NEW YORKER, Feb. 14, 2005, at 106,
Gary Wil106, available at http://www.newyorker.com/printables/fact/050214fa-fact6;
liams, Indefinite Detention and ExtraordinaryRendition, L.A. LAW., Sept. 2006, at 44, 47-48.
171
See Arar v. Ashcroft, 414 F. Supp. 2d 250, 256 (E.D.N.Y. 2006); Mayer, supra note
170, at 106; Williams, supra note 170, at 47.
172 See Arar, 414 F. Supp. 2d at 256.
173
See Scott Shane, The Costs of Outsourcing Interrogation:A Canadian Muslim's Long
Ordeal in Syria, N.Y. TIMES, May 29, 2005, at 10.
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United States should not have sent him to Syria precisely because it
was more likely than not that he would be tortured there. Under
these circumstances, the Secretary of State must promptly seek assurances from the country to which an alien is to be removed that the
country will not torture the alien once he arrives there, and the Secretary must be satisfied that it is more likely than not that the alien will
not be tortured in that country. 174 In Arar's case, assuming that the
Secretary did in fact seek such assurances from Syria, it is difficult to
believe that the "more likely than not" standard was met for two reasons. First, the State Department's own reports indicate that Syrian
authorities engage in torture.1 75 Second, the United States has a distrustful relationship with Syria. 176 Unfortunately, it is impossible to
know if this standard was met because the decisions by the Secretary
of State and the Attorney General were not subject to judicial
77
review. 1
3.

JudicialReview

Arar would have had difficulty procuring judicial review of the
Attorney General's decision to remove him to Syria because U.S. law
limits the availability of judicial review. 178 Moreover, as a practical
matter, because the INS informed Arar that he was to be removed to
Syria the same day that the United States removed him, 179 he had
little time to file an appeal or contact his lawyer before he was removed.
However, if the government had afforded Arar enough time to
appeal his removal, he could have challenged the government's actions in two ways. After the final removal order was issued, Arar could
have challenged the order through a habeas petition' 80 and appealed
18 1
the removal order itself.

In filing a habeas petition, Arar could have argued both that his
detention was unlawful because he was admissible and that he was detained for too long. However, Arar would likely have lost on both of
these grounds. Courts review inadmissibility decisions only to the ex174

See AI-Anazi v. Bush, 370 F. Supp. 2d 188, 192 (D.D.C. 2005).

175

See SYRIA: COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES, supra note 134.

176

See BUREAU OF NEAR E. AFFAIRS, U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, BACKGROUND REPORT: SYRIA

(2007), available at http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/3580.htm.

177
178
179

See Arar, 414 F. Supp. 2d at 267.
See supra notes 29-40 and accompanying text.
See ARAR COMM'N REPORT: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 118, at 139,

154. Arar was served with the order at four o'clock in the morning and removed later that
day to Jordan. See id.

180

See INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 313 (2001) (finding that 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b) does

not preclude habeas jurisdiction over removal orders not subject to judicial review).

181

See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b) (9) (2000) ("Judicial review... shall be available only... of a

final order under this section.").
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tent of determining that the government has a "facially legitimate and
bona fide reason" for exclusion. 18 2 Given this low standard of review,
a court would be unlikely to overturn the INS's determination that
Arar was a terrorist, even if the grounds for that determination were
suspect.183 As for the length of his detention, while the U.S. Supreme
Court has found a constitutional violation in holding an inadmissible
alien indefinitely, 8 4 it is unlikely that a court would consider holding
an inadmissible alien like Arar for twelve days to be holding him "indefinitely." Thus, Arar was unlikely to succeed on either of these arguments. However, since Arar's removal, the REAL ID Act has changed
the appeals process and aliens can no longer file habeas petitions for
review of removal orders. 8 5 To obtain judicial review of final removal
orders, aliens must now use 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a) (2) (D), which permits
review of legal and constitutional questions. However, if Arar's case is
any indication, many aliens lack the time to bring such appeals before
the United States removes them under summary removal because the
DHS tends to remove aliens immediately after serving the final
186

order.

Thus, if Arar's case occurred today and he filed his petition after
the final order had issued, he would still lose the inadmissibility and
unlawful detention arguments, but he might succeed on other claims.
To file such claims, Arar would have to establish the court's jurisdiction to hear his case. While the language of 8 U.S.C. § 1252 generally
8 7
limits the jurisdiction of courts of appeals in immigration cases,1
Arar, or someone in his place today, could establish that jurisdiction
exists. Arar could make three arguments in support of jurisdiction:
(1) section 1252(a) (2) (D) gives the court jurisdiction to hear constitutional claims;1 88 (2) the decision to remove him to a country is not
expressly a discretionary decision of the Attorney General; 8 9 and (3)
section 1252(g) does not preclude the claim because it is not an ap-

182 Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 770 (1972); seeAdams v. Baker, 909 F.2d 643,
647 (1st Cir. 1990) (stating that inadmissibility decisions are reviewed only for clear error);
supra note 34 and accompanying text.
183 See8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4) (B) (2000 & Supp. V 2005) ("[A]dministrative findings of
fact are conclusive unless any reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to conclude to
the contrary ....").This is in contrast to the relatively higherjudicial standard for assurances from a foreign country where an alien fears torture if removed to that country. See
AI-Anazi v. Bush, 370 F. Supp. 2d 188, 192 (D.D.C. 2005).
184
See Clark v. Martinez, 543 U.S. 371, 386 (2005).
185
REAL ID Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-13, § 106, 119 Stat. 231, 310-11 (codified at
8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(9) (2000 & Supp. V 2005)).
186
See infra note 254.
187
See supra notes 35-40.
188
See8 U.S.C. § 1252(a) (2) (D) (Supp. V. 2005).
189
See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a) (2) (B) (ii) (Supp. V 2005).
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peal of a decision to "commence proceedings, adjudicate cases, or ex19 0
ecute removal orders.
Had Arar's case occurred after Congress enacted the REAL ID
Act, he could have argued that a court had jurisdiction to hear his
case under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a) (2) (D) because the removal order likely
violated the Constitution. It is likely a violation of substantive due process because an alien has, at minimum, a right to be free from torture
or physical abuse. 19 ' While the government can argue that Syria, not
the United States, tortured Arar and thus there was no violation of the
Constitution, this is a weak argument. The U.S. government likely acquiesced in Arar's torture by sending him to a country where he
would likely be tortured. 192 Further, Arar could also have argued that
detaining him without counsel for nine days, allowing him to meet
with counsel once, and then removing him to a country where he
would likely be tortured violated procedural due process.1 93 Thus,
there would likely be jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252 (a) (2)(D) to
1 94
hear the constitutional due process claim.
The second argument, here under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a) (2) (B) (ii),
is also compelling. Because the Attorney General did not have discretion to send Arar to Syria, a court of appeals could still review Arar's
removal order. 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b) (2) (C) provides that if "the Attorney General decides that removing the alien to the country is prejudicial to the United States," the Attorney General may select another
country. 195 At least one circuit has held that the statutory restriction
on judicial review applies only when Congress has clearly stated that
190
See id. § 1252(g).
191
See Amanullah v. Nelson, 811 F.2d 1, 9 (1st Cir. 1987).
192
See8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(A) (2000); 8 C.F.R. § 208.1(a) (2007); id. § 208.18(a)(7)
(stating that a government acquiesces to torture under the Convention Against Torture
(CAT) if "the public official, prior to the activity constituting torture, ha[s] awareness of
such activity and thereafter breach[es] his or her legal responsibility to intervene to prevent such activity"); see also 8 C.F.R. § 208.18(d) (2007) (discussing the U.S. government's
obligation when an alien subject to removal under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(c) seeks protection
under Article 3 (nonrefoulement) of the CAT). In Arar's civil suit the district court noted
that Arar's torture allegedly was a result of his removal from the United States by U.S.
government officials. See Arar v. Ashcroft, 414 F. Supp. 2d 250, 278 (E.D.N.Y. 2006). Further, Second Circuit Court of Appeals Judge Jos6 Cabranes stated "[t]here's something
awfully mechanistic about [the government's argument that the Constitution did not protect Arar from torture in Syria] which is difficult to understand." See Simon Houpt, Judges
Question U.S. Logic in Arar Hearing,THE GLOBE & MAIL, Nov. 10, 2007, at A10.
193
See Arar, 414 F. Supp. 2d at 268 (explaining that Arar's "case thus raises a serious
question whether the procedural system administrating the admission and exclusion of
aliens is truly capable of remedying the alleged torture and detention"); id. at 280 ("Arar
alleges that his final order of removal was issued moments before his removal to Syria,
which suggests that it may have been unforeseeable or impossible to successfully seek a
stay, preserving Arar's procedural rights under the INA.").
194
See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a) (2) (D) (Supp. V 2005).
195
See id. § 1231(b)(2)(C) (2000) (emphasis added).
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the only basis of the decision was the Attorney General's discretion.1 96
While 8 U.S.C. § 1231 (b) (2) (C) (iv) states that the Attorney General
may "decide[ ] that removing the alien to the [designated] country is
prejudicial to the United States,"' 9 7 which suggests that the decision
of prejudice is a discretionary one, the Attorney General lacks the discretion to violate FARRA or the Constitution. 9 8 Thus, by removing
Arar to Syria, the Attorney General violated U.S. law and the Constitution, and because the Attorney General does not have the discretion
to violate either, the decision by the Attorney General to send Arar to
Syria could have been subject to judicial review.
Arar's third argument would be that § 125 2(g), which prohibits
judicial review of the Attorney General's decision to either "commence proceedings, adjudicate cases, or execute removal orders,"1 9 9
does not apply to preclude judicial review of his removal order. Arar
would not be challenging the decision to commence proceedings, as
he would not be contesting his inadmissibility or removability. He
also would not be challenging the decision to adjudicate the case because he would not be questioning the BIA's authority to hear his
case, because his case would be filed with a court of appeals. 20 0 Finally, Arar would not be appealing for review of the Attorney General's decision to execute the order but rather would be claiming that
the order itself violates the Constitution. Thus, § 125 2(g) would not
preclude Arar from challenging his removal to a country that engages
in torture.
Assuming that Arar was able to establish jurisdiction, he could
then challenge the constitutionality of the removal order. 20 1 The
most likely constitutional challenge would be a claim alleging a denial
of procedural due process.20 2 This is a complicated claim to raise beSee Alaka v. Att'y Gen., 456 F.3d 88, 95 (3d Cir. 2006).
197 8 U.S.C. 1231(b) (2) (C) (iv) (2000).
198 See Kwai Fun Wong v. United States, 373 F.3d 952, 963 (9th Cir. 2004).
199 8. U.S.C. § 1252(g) (Supp. V 2005); Reno v. Amer.-Arab Anti-Discrimination
Comm., 525 U.S. 471, 482 (1999). In Reno, the Supreme Court held that 8 U.S.C.
§ 125 2(g) was not intended to apply to all aspects of a deportation proceeding; instead the
section's narrow application was limited to decisions by the Attorney General to "commence proceedings, adjudicate cases, or execute removal orders." See id. The Court reasoned that these three decisions were excluded from judicial review to make it easier for
the INS to "'decline to institute proceedings, terminate proceedings, or decline to execute a
final order of deportation."' Id. at 483-84 (emphasis added).
20
See Selgeka v. Carroll, 184 F.3d 337, 342 (4th Cir. 1999).
201
While in Arar's case the government likely violated FARRA and the policy of
nonrefoulement, aliens cannot maintain claims under the FARRA. See Arar v. Ashcroft,
414 F. Supp. 2d 250, 264 (E.D.N.Y. 2006).
202
Substantive due process rights protect persons from governmental actions that are
arbitrary and oppressive. See County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 846 (1998)
(citing Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 331 (1986)). An example of a substantive due
process right is the right to be free from discrimination on the basis of race, gender, or
national origin. See City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 470-71
196
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cause the threshold inquiry is whether an inadmissible alien is entitled
to any process at all. To claim a Due Process Clause violation, an individual must demonstrate that his or her right to life, liberty, or property was violated. 20 3 Because an unadmitted, nonresident alien has no
constitutional right of entry to the United States, 20 4 it would not violate due process to deny such an individual the right to appeal an
inadmissibility determination. However where, as in the case of summary removal on security grounds, an alien is subject to removal to a
country that engages in torture, due process protects the alien's life
interest, and as such, the alien has a right to a hearing before being
removed.
In addition, Arar could have raised two procedural violations.
First, he could have argued that it was a violation of due process to
provide him with so little time to file an appeal. Second, Arar could
have argued that removing him to a country where he might face torture without first holding a hearing deprived him of his life interest
guaranteed by the Due Process Clause. If Arar could establish that the
United States would violate his life interest by removal to Syria, he
would reach the second part of the due process test: whether the process he was afforded satisfies procedural due process. 20 5 In determining whether the process the U.S. government afforded him satisfied
the requirements of the Due Process Clause, a court must weigh the
cost of an erroneous decision as well as the interests of the individual
and the government. 20 6 Regardless of how minimal the due process
protections are for inadmissible aliens,20 7 when an alien's life interest
is at stake, the individual interest should at least counter any government-advocated bona fide reason 20 8 and should give a court pause
before overriding such a strong individual interest. 20 9 Further, when
(1985) (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Procedural due process
rights are "meant to protect persons ... from the mistaken or unjustified deprivation of
life, liberty, or property." Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 259 (1978).
203
See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 332 (1976) (finding that Eldridge was able to
challenge the sufficiency of the procedures afforded to him under a due process argument
because he had a property interest in the continued receipt of government benefits).
204 See Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 762 (1972).
205
See Mathews, 424 U.S. at 332-33; infra notes 256-259 and accompanying text.
206
See Mathews, 424 U.S. at 334-35; infta Part II.B.
207
See supra notes 2-3, 29-34 and accompanying text.
208
See Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 425-27 (1979). The U.S. Supreme Court in
Addington held that the individual interest in proceedings to confine the individual to a
mental hospital outweighs the public interest in providing health care to its citizens and
"protect[ing] the community from the dangeroustendencies of some who are mentally ill."
See id. at 426 (emphasis added). The Court went on to state that "the individual should not
be asked to share equally with society the risk of error when the possible injury to the
individual is significantly greater than any possible harm to the state." Id. at 427; see also
infra Part III.B (discussing the adequacy of the process afforded Arar and the risks and
costs to him and the U.S. government of more procedure).
209
See Addington, 441 U.S. at 425-27.
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the alien faces removal to a country that engages in torture and, after
removal, the alien is in fact tortured, the cost of error is very high.
To establish the inadequacy of the current process, Arar could
argue that receiving mere hours between being served with a removal
order and being removed does not allow an adequate opportunity to
be heard and thus the government action would violate the Due Process Clause. Although it is unclear whether the Constitution requires
the government to give an alien inadmissible on security grounds a
hearing before removal, the Supreme Court has stated that the oppor2 10
tunity to be heard "is a fundamental requirement of due process."
Presumably, the current process is inadequate if the government's removal procedure failed to provide Arar with an appropriate opportunity to be heard. 21 ' While the minimum amount of time necessary to
satisfy the Due Process Clause is unclear, due process likely requires
more than the few hours Arar was afforded. 2 12 Further, Arar may also
be able to claim that the government violated his due process rights by
removing him to Syria, where he was tortured, without first holding a
hearing. This would be a slightly more difficult argument to make
given that it is unclear how much process inadmissible aliens are entitled to under the Constitution, 2 13 but given the strong life interest and
the cost of error involved, Arar could argue that some kind of hearing
2

is required.

14

Regardless of whether Arar's procedural due process claims were
successful, he could allege that his treatment by U.S. officials violated
his substantive due process rights. First, Arar could challenge his detention without counsel for nine days. 2 15 Second, he could argue
that, by sending him to a country known to engage in torture, the U.S.
government acquiesced to the torture he was ultimately subjected to
in Syria in violation of the Due Process Clause. Arar may have difficulty proving the first allegation because the right to counsel in immigration proceedings attaches only under normal removal
210
See Mathews, 424 U.S. at 333 (citing Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552 (1965));
accord Landon v. Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21, 32 (1982) (holding that a resident alien is entitled
to due process rights with respect to a removal hearing).
211
See Arar v. Ashcroft, 414 F. Supp. 2d 250, 273 (E.D.N.Y. 2006) (noting that the
government "rendered meaningful review an impossibility").
212
The Supreme Court has suggested that providing eleven hours between detaining a
resident alien and holding an exclusion proceeding for that alien may violate due process.
See Landon, 459 U.S. at 35-37 (dictum).
213
See supra notes 2-3, 29-34 and accompanying text.
214
See Arar, 414 F. Supp. 2d at 268 (stating that Arar's case "raises a serious question
whether the procedural system administrating the admission and exclusion of aliens is
truly capable of remedying the alleged torture and detention" that Arar faced); id. at 278
(noting that Arar was denied "a meaningful process of any kind").
215
See ARAR COMM'N REPORT: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 118, at
167-68.
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proceedings, 2 16 which were inapplicable to Arar. 2 17 Arar could likely
establish the second basis because he was likely to be, and indeed was,
tortured in Syria and he would not have been in Syria but for the
Attorney General's removal order. Thus, the Attorney General likely
violated the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.
Thus, while Arar would have faced serious jurisdictional impediments in challenging his removal to Syria, they would not have been
insurmountable. Assuming that Arar had enough time to retain counsel and appeal his removal order, he would have had several grounds
for doing so. While it is unlikely that Arar could have challenged the
inadmissibility decision itself, he likely could have challenged Syria as
the country of his removal.
B.

Canadian Law
1.

Inadmissibility and the Order of Removal

If Maher Arar had instead arrived in Canada and was not a Canadian citizen but was instead a dual national of Syria and another country, a Canadian immigration officer would likely have deemed him
inadmissible on security grounds as a member of a terrorist organization. 218 After making this determination, the immigration officer
would have contacted Security Review at CBSA for approval before
refusing Arar admission and proceeding with an inadmissibility report. 219 If CBSA had approved, the immigration officer (or CBSA)
would then have written the report and outlined the bases for Arar's
inadmissibility. 220 However, it is important to note that before a report was written, Arar could have invoked his right to withdraw his
application to enter Canada and have returned to his country of citizenship. 22 1 As a dual national, Arar could have returned to Syria or to
the other country of his citizenship. 2 22 Arar would likely have asked to
leave to his other country of citizenship, and as long as the Canadian
government did not deem him a danger to the public, 223 he would
have been allowed to do so.
216 See8 U.S.C. § 1229a(b)(4)(A) (2000).
217 See supra text accompanying note 24.
218 See Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, 2001 S.C., ch. 27, § 34(1)(f) (Can.).
An immigration officer would have made this determination because Arar was subject to a
"lookout" in the Canadian immigration databases. See ARAR COMM'N REPORT: ANALYSIS AND
RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 118, at 19.
219
See ENFORCEMENT MANUAL, WRITING 44(1) REPORTS, supra note 63, at 10.

220
221
222
223

See
See
See
See

Immigration and Refugee Protection Act § 44(1).
supra text accompanying notes 113-15.
supra text accompanying notes 114-15.
supra note 115 and accompanying text.
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647

However, if the immigration officer had issued a report, it would
have been forwarded to the Minister of CIC for review.2 24 It is highly
unlikely that the Minister would have chosen, with the Minister of PS,
to pursue a security certificate because of the rarity of such an occurrence. 225 Thus, if Arar's case had reached this point, the Minister
would likely have referred Arar to the Board for an admissibility
22 6
hearing.
For such a hearing, Arar would not only have had the right to an
attorney, 2 27 but he also would receive a reasonable amount of time to
find an attorney and to allow the attorney to prepare his case. 228 Arar
would have had the right to present evidence and cross-examine any
witnesses the government presented. 229 Given the findings of the Canadian commission appointed to investigate his case, it is unlikely that
the Board would have found Arar inadmissible because the Canadian
government lacked the information to charge him with a crime. 23 0 As
the Canadian government could not charge Arar, it probably lacked
sufficient information to establish that he was inadmissible on security
2 31
grounds.
Regardless of the outcome of the admissibility hearing, Arar
could have filed a PRRA application during the proceeding to ensure
that Canada could not remove him to Syria. 232 Even if the Minister of
CIC refused to grant the PRRA, upon review, it is unlikely that the
Board would have believed that it was reasonable for the Minister to
rely on assurances from the Syrian government that Arar would not be
tortured because of Syria's infamous human rights record. 233 If the
Minister granted the PRRA, it likely would have only prevented Arar's
removal to Syria, not to the country of his other citizenship, assuming
that the other country did not engage in torture. 23 4 However, even if
the Minister thought Arar's fears were well-founded, the Canadian
government could still have removed Arar to Syria if the Minister
thought that he was a danger to Canadian security. 2 35 If the Minister
See Immigration and Refugee Protection Act § 44(1).
See supra note 106 and accompanying text.
226
See Immigration and Refugee Protection Act § 44(2).
227
See id. § 167.
228
See WALDMAN, supra note 70, at 103.
229
See id. at 105.
230
See ARpR COMM'N REPORT: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 118, at 152.
231
See supra note 137 and accompanying text.
232
See Immigration and Refugee Protection Act § 112(1); supra notes 78-88 and accompanying text.
233
See Suresh v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship & Immigration), [2002] 1 S.C.R. 3,
2002 SCC 1, paras. 39, 124 (Can.) (stating that it is difficult to rely "too heavily on assurances by a state that it will refrain from torture in the future when it has engaged in illegal
torture or allowed others to do so on its territory in the past").
234
See Immigration and Refugee Protection Act § 115(1).
235
See id. § 115(2); Suresh, 1 S.C.R. at para. 58.
224
225
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issued this "danger opinion," a court would likely overturn it either
because it was patently unreasonable or because Arar's case was not an
236
exceptional one.

At the end of the admissibility hearing, the Board would have to
determine Arar's admissibility. 2 37 If Arar was admissible, he would
have been released from custody and allowed to proceed to his destination country; if he was inadmissible, he would have been subject to
a removal order. 238 If Arar was inadmissible on security grounds, he
would have had no right to appeal to the Board, 2 39 but he would have
240
been able to ask for leave to file an appeal with a federal court.

Even if Arar received adverse decisions on all of these fronts-the
Minister had denied Arar's PRRA application, Arar had been granted
leave to appeal and the federal court had affirmed that denial, Arar's
choice to return to his other country of citizenship had been ignored,
and the Minister chose to remove him to Syria because of the danger
he posed to Canada 24 1-Arar still could have appealed the constitutionality of Syria as his country of removal under section 7 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. 2 42 Moreover, he likely would
have won this appeal because, under the applicable standard of review, the Minister's decision was patently unreasonable since it could
not be supported by the evidence. 243 As the government lacked the
necessary information to charge Arar with a crime, there was likely
insufficient evidence to support the determination that he posed a
danger to national security.2 4 4 Thus, given the extensive opportunities forjudicial review in Canada, it is unlikely that Canada could have
removed Arar to Syria through an admissibility hearing.
If instead the Ministers of CIC and PS had chosen the highly unlikely course of issuing a security certificate, it is still unlikely that Canadian law would have allowed Arar to be removed to Syria. Once the
Ministers decided to issue the certificate, it would have been referred
to a federal court and the chiefjudge, or ajudge the chief designates,
would determine the certificate's reasonableness. 245 During the hearing, Aar could have applied for a PRRA, which would have stopped
236

237
238
239
240

See
See
See
See
See

Suresh, 1 S.C.R. at paras. 58, 78, 129.
Immigration and Refugee Protection Act § 45.
id. § 45(d).
id. § 64(1).
supra note 75 and accompanying text.

See supra text accompanying note 115.
See Suresh v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship & Immigration), [2002] 1 S.C.R. 3,
2002 SCC 1, para. 27 (Can.).
243
See id. at paras. 28, 39.
244
See id. at para. 90; ARAR COMM'N REPORT: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS, supra
note 118, at 152.
245
See Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, 2001 S.C., ch. 27, §§ 76, 80(1) (Can.).
241

242
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the proceeding. 246 The PRRA application in this situation would be
subject to the same review as a PRRA application in an admissibility
hearing. 247 If the Minister granted the PRRA, Canada could not have
removed Arar to Syria under a reasonable security certificate unless
conditions in the country changed such that it was unlikely that Arar
would have been tortured in Syria. 24 8 Further, even if the Minister
denied the PRRA, the judge could have suspended the certificate proceedings and quashed the Minister's PRRA decision if the judge
thought that the Minister's PRRA decision was unlawful, thus allowing
the Minister to decide whether to issue a "danger opinion.

'24 9

If the

Minister issued a danger opinion the judge could overturn it if Arar's
case was not an exceptional one, which it likely was not given that the
Canadian government lacked the necessary information to charge
him with a crime. 250 If the judge found the certificate reasonable and
the PRRA application was either not filed or lawfully denied, the certificate would have become a deportation order that Arar could not
25 1
have appealed to either the Board or a federal court.
Thus, while there is a remote possibility that Arar could have
been removed to Syria under Canadian law, this is unlikely given the
opportunities for judicial review. While procedural safeguards do not
inherently protect constitutional and human rights, they do increase
the chances that discretionary decisions by either the Minister of CIC
or of PS will be overturned should they constitute an abuse of discretion. These protections far exceed the protections under U.S. law,
which do not provide meaningful opportunities for judicial review.
III
THE PROBLEM WITH UNCHECKED DIsCRETION AND
A PROPOSED SOLUTION

Perhaps the most disturbing aspect of Arar's case is the Attorney
General's lack of accountability. The most fundamental way to ensure

the accountability of the executive branch is through judicial review.
While it is not certain that Arar would not have been removed to and
tortured in Syria had the United States afforded Arar the opportunity
to appeal his removal order, at least an independent adjudicator
would have been able to review the Attorney General's decision to
determine both its legal and constitutional validity.
See id. § 79(1).
See supra notes 98-101 and accompanying text.
248
See Immigration and Refugee Protection Act §§ 114(2), 115(2).
249
See id. §§ 80(2), 115(2)(a); Charkaoui v. Canada (Citizenship & Immigration),
[2007] 1 S.C.R. 350, 2007 SCC 9 paras. 49-52, 63 (Can.); supra notes 87-88.
250
See supra note 230 and accompanying text.
251
See id. §§ 80(3), 81(b).
246
247
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The Current Process Afforded

The current summary removal process provided by the United
States leaves much to be desired. Since Arar was removed, Congress
has further restricted the availability of judicial review by enacting the
REAL ID Act of 2005.252 Today, aliens have no right to habeas review. 253 Further, aliens, like Arar, can be summarily removed from
the United States to countries that may or may not torture them with
minimal notice of the decision. 2 54 The U.S. government would likely
argue that allowing aliens who are subject to summary removal on
security grounds five days to respond in writing to an agency document is enough notice of the inadmissibility decision and, hence, the
subsequent removal decision. This may be true if, unlike in Arar's
case, the alien has more than one day to consult an attorney and the
government has provided the basis for the removal order. 255 Regardless of whether one day was enough time to consult an attorney, it is
unlikely that a few hours was enough time to respond to the decision
to remove Arar to Syria or file an appeal.
B.

The Constitutional Adequacy of the Process Afforded

To determine whether the current summary removal process satisfies the Due Process Clause, it is necessary to engage in the balancing test set out by the Supreme Court in Mathews v. Eldridge.256 The
balancing test applies if a state actor has violated a life, liberty, or
property interest.2 5 7 In the case of an alien removed from the United
States to a country that tortures the alien, the United States would
likely violate a life interest, giving the alien the ability to invoke due
process protection. 258 A process is constitutionally valid if the balance
of the governmental interest, the individual interest, and the risk of
259
error weighs in favor of the existing process.
See supra notes 185 and accompanying text.
See supra Part II.A.3.
254
See, e.g., Arar v. Ashcroft, 414 F. Supp. 2d 250, 254 (E.D.N.Y. 2006). Arar was served
with the final removal order at four o'clock in the morning on October 8, 2002, and physically removed from the United States "later that day." See id. However, the detention
center where the INS originally held Arar told his lawyer that he had been removed from
the center "between three and four o'clock that morning." See COMM'N REPORT: FACTUAL
252
253

BACKGROUND VOLUME

I, supra note 23, at 200.

The document that the INS gave Arar merely told him that he was inadmissible. See
Arar, 414 F. Supp. 2d at 253.
256
424 U.S. 319, 334-35 (1976).
257
See supra notes 203, 206 and accompanying text.
258
See Nunez v. Boldin, 537 F. Supp. 578, 584-87 (S.D. Tex. 1982) (stating that life
interests are implicated when considering an asylum application where the alien would be
subject to persecution if it is not granted); supra notes 203-05 and accompanying text.
259
Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335.
255
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There is a strong government interest in national security in summary removals on security-related grounds and the courts have consistently deferred to national security decisions by Congress and the
Executive.2 60 Further, the Supreme Court has held that the Attorney
General should not have to make these reasons public.2 61 This is reasonable because if the Attorney General were forced to reveal why
removing an alien to a particular country would prejudice the United
States, she may be forced to compromise military or intelligence operations in that country. 262 There are, however, strong foreign relation
costs in not reviewing such a determination. The United States faced
diplomatic problems with Canada after it was revealed that the United
States had removed Arar to Syria. 263 Further, the treatment of Arar
and the related U.S. extraordinary rendition policy have diminished
2 64
the reputation of the United States abroad.
The U.S. government also has a strong interest in the efficiency
of the current immigration system.2 65 Hundreds of thousands of
aliens arrive at U.S. borders everyday. To require judicial review for
each inadmissible alien before removing him or her to a particular
country could cost a significant amount of money and create a huge
adjudicative backlog. 266 However, only a small fraction of those persons entering the United States are inadmissible, and an even smaller
proportion of these persons are inadmissible on security grounds.
Hence, in the absence of information regarding how many aliens are
inadmissible and removed on security grounds, 267 the Attorney General would have a difficult time arguing that the cost to the govern260 See, e.g., Bassiouni v. FBI, 436 F.3d 712, 724 (7th Cir. 2006) (noting that national
security issues belong to the Executive), cert. denied, 127 S. Ct. 709 (2006), reh'g denied, 127
S. Ct. 1170 (2007); United States v. Afshari, 426 F.3d 1150, 1161 (9th Cir. 2005).
261 See Reno v. Amer.-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm., 525 U.S. 471, 491 (1999).
262 See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 532-33 (2004). In Hamdi, the government
argued that it could not afford a U.S. citizen enemy combatant more process than it had
given him because to provide more would "intrude on the sensitive secrets of national
defense." See id. at 531-32. The U.S. Supreme Court held that the government's process
was unconstitutional and required the government to provide more procedural safeguards.
See id. at 533.
263 See John Geddes, Blame America, MACLFAN'S, Dec. 8, 2003, at 31, 31; Christopher
Mason, Canada Formally Protests to U.S. over Deported Man, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 7, 2006, at A6.
264
See Aziz Z. Huq, ExtraordinaryRendition and the Wages of Hypocrisy, 23 WORLD POL'YJ.
25, 29-30 (2006).
265
See Landon v. Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21, 34 (1982).
266
But see Lenni B. Benson, Back to the Future: Congress Attacks the Right toJudicial Review
of ImmigrationProceedings, 29 CONN. L. REv. 1411, 1442-43 n.159 (1997) (arguing that judicial review of immigration proceedings is not a significant cause of the delay in removing
aliens from the United States).
267
While in 2005 DHS removed 208,521 aliens through formal removal procedures,
not all of them would have been removed on security grounds. See MARy DOUGHERTY ET
AL., DEP'T OF HOMELAND SEC., IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS: 2005, at 1, 5 (2006),
available at http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/statistics/yearbook/2005/Enforcement.
AR_05.pdf.
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ment should be given great weight in the Mathews calculus. Thus,
requiring a hearing for those persons inadmissible on security
grounds would likely create only a modest increase in cost and delays.
Nevertheless, regardless of the strength of the counterarguments,
a court would likely find in favor of the Attorney General, reasoning
that there is a strong government interest in not having a hearing
because of the judicial deference to the Executive when national security is implicated.
The next element in the balance is the individual life interest that
aliens have at stake in summary removal proceedings. The life of an
alien is at risk if the government removes the alien to a country that
engages in torture. Aliens also have an interest in learning the
grounds for removal, the removal procedure, the country to which the
United States intends to remove them, and the evidence upon which
the government has made these decisions so that they may retain an
attorney and meaningfully explore their legal rights.
The government would likely counter that aliens would only appeal removal orders to delay their inevitable removal, thus increasing
the strain on the already resource-strapped judicial and immigration
systems. While this criticism would likely be true for some aliens, for
others, an appeal would be the only way to prevent their removal to
countries that might torture them. Thus, regardless of the government's counterargument, an alien's individual interest in life should
weigh strongly against the constitutionality of the current process.
The risk of error factor in the Mathews balancing test also weighs
strongly in favor of the inadmissible alien. As discussed earlier, while
there would be an increased monetary cost in providing more process,
the likelihood of an error in the current process is substantial. If only
the Attorney General decides whether an alien is inadmissible on security grounds, to which country the alien should be removed, and (in
concert with the Secretary of State) whether the alien would be subject to torture, then in the absence of an adversarial process, there is a
great risk that the decision will be wrong. 268 While the adversarial
process does not guarantee that the correct decision will be reached,
it does ensure that the relevant decision-maker has access to as much
information as possible and that the available evidence is subject to
exacting scrutiny. 269 Thus, a hearing will not ensure that an alien is
not subject to torture, but it will reduce the risk that it will occur.
268
Cf Charkaoui v. Canada (Citizenship & Immigration), [2007] 1 S.C.R. 350, 2007
SCC 9 paras. 49-52, 63 (Can.) (suggesting that in Canadian Security Certificate proceedings, where there is no adversarial process, federal judges may make incorrect decisions
because they are not based on all of the available evidence or on correct interpretations of
the law).
269
Cf id.
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However, as the government might also point out, if a court overturns a correct DHS decision there may be serious national security
implications. If an alien was a threat to national security and if removing the alien to his designated country did prejudice the United States
because the alien was subsequently able to engage in terrorist activities
in that country, the additional procedure would hamper U.S. national
security. Nevertheless, regardless of the country to which the United
States removed the alien, he could still migrate to the country he had
wanted to be removed to and could resume terrorist activities there.
The overall balance of the test is a close one. However, the life
interest of the alien and the constitutional interest in reducing due
process violations would likely outweigh the government's national security interest. 270 Thus, under Mathews, I believe the current process
is constitutionally inadequate.
C.

A Possible Solution

As I believe that the current removal process for aliens inadmissible to the United States on security grounds is constitutionally inadequate, I propose a new process that would protect both the
Constitution and U.S. national security. This new process is meant to
guard against one of the worst transgressions of U.S. law: sending
inadmissible aliens, such as Maher Arar, to countries where they will
be tortured. In order to ensure consistency among the circuits and to
avoid separation of power challenges, Congress should enact such a
process as national law.
In comparing the U.S. and Canadian removal laws that could
have applied to Arar, it is apparent that aspects of the Canadian process could be incorporated into U.S. removal proceedings to cure the
constitutional defects of the current U.S. process. However, I concede
that the United States cannot implement wholesale Canadian removal
proceedings because the United States would be unable to administer
the Canadian process fully. The United States has approximately five
times as many aliens trying to enter its borders as Canada does each
year.2 7 1 To impose the Canadian process without accounting for the
financial and administrative burdens that would be imposed on the
U.S. immigration system would be impractical and overly idealistic.
However, there are elements of the Canadian removal process for forSee supra notes 208-09, 214 and accompanying text.
In 2005, the U.S. admitted 175,400,000 nonimmigrants. See OFFICE OF IMMIGRATION
STATISTICS, DEP'T OF HOMELAND SEC., 2005 YEARBOOK OF IMMIGRATION STATISTICS 63
(2006), available at http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/statistics/yearbook/2005/
OIS_2005_Yearbook.pdf. This number does not include persons arriving from Canada or
Mexico on short trips. See id. In contrast, Canada admitted 36,160,100 persons in 2005.
See Statistics Canada, Non-Resident Travellers Entering Canada, http://www40.statcan.ca/
101/cst0l/arts34.htm (last visited Jan. 24, 2008).
270
271
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eign nationals inadmissible on security grounds that the United States
can implement that would not occasion such large costs.
For example, under Canadian law, if Canada contemplates removing a foreign national to a country where he may be tortured, this
implicates the procedural protections of section 7 of the Canadian
Charter of Rights and Freedoms. 27 2 As U.S. law already forbids removing an alien to face torture in a foreign country, the Due Process
2 73
Clause should be invoked to protect both the alien and U.S. law.

This minimal extension of the Due Process Clause would be consistent with U.S. legal precedent. 274 As the right to be free from torture
is already enshrined in U.S. law in FARRA,2 75 the only change the U.S.
government would have to make is ensuring that the Attorney General actually complies with the Act. The best way to ensure compliance with FARRA is to create a process in which there is little
discretion to violate it by allowing aliens inadmissible on security
grounds to challenge the country for removal under FARRA. To challenge the country for removal, aliens inadmissible to the United States
on security grounds should have a right of automatic review or removal orders when there is a high probability that they would be subject to torture in their country of removal.
The most conservative way to afford an automatic right of review
to aliens who would likely be subject to torture in the country of removal would be to define the right narrowly. Congress could restrict
such review to only those aliens subject to removal to countries that
the State Department has determined engage in torture. The list of
these countries could be subject to review at set intervals to ensure
they reflect current human rights trends. The scope of this review
would be a compromise to the Canadian right to automatic review for
all inadmissible aliens. 276 This compromise recognizes both the administrative infeasibility of granting an automatic right of review to all
inadmissible aliens who arrive at the U.S. border and U.S. legal
27 7
precedent.
In exercising this right of review, the United States should not
allow aliens to challenge the determination that they are inadmissible
on security grounds. While inadmissible foreign nationals are able to
do so under Canadian law, 278 such a right would be contrary to U.S.
272

SCC 9,
273
274
275
276
277
278

See Charkaoui v. Canada (Citizenship & Immigration), [2007] 1 S.C.R. 350, 2007
para. 3 (Can.).
See supra notes 46-49 and accompanying text.
See supra note 30-34 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 47-49 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 75, 114-15 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 30-33 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 62, 90 and accompanying text.
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legal precedent. 279 The Supreme Court has developed a clear line of
jurisprudence that states it is the prerogative of the sovereign to ex28 0
clude persons from the United States.
However, aliens inadmissible on security grounds should be able
to challenge the Attorney General's designation of the country to
which the United States will remove them. To ensure that inadmissible aliens may challenge the Attorney General's designation, they
should be given notice both of the removal decision and their right to
a hearing. Arguably, unlike Arar, an alien should be given more than
a few hours notice before the government removes that individual in
order to ensure time to file an appeal. There is some basis in U.S. law
for this requirement as the Supreme Court has stated that due process
requires both an opportunity to be heard and that the hearing be held
"at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner."' 28 1 There is a
similar presumption in Canadian removal proceedings in that it is reversible error to not allow an alien enough time to prepare his case
with his attorney. 28 2 Thus, while both jurisdictions provide that an
inadmissible alien must be afforded some time before facing removal
proceedings, it is unclear how much time is sufficient.
In keeping with current U.S. law, it appears as though ten days
would be a sufficient period of time to allow an alien to prepare his
case against removal to a country that engages in torture. The normal
removal proceedings provision provides ten days to file a written response to inadmissibility determinations. 28 3 As statutes have a presumption of validity, 28 4 this time frame would likely be reasonable to
allow an alien to appeal his country of removal decision. This is
clearly not satisfied in the current summary removal process, and thus
there should be the same mandatory "waiting period" that exists in
normal removal proceedings.
This right of review should be before an independent adjudicator, ideally a U.S. federal judge. A federal judge would be the appropriate adjudicator because immigration law is within the jurisdiction
of the federal courts and because, unlike an IJ, a federal judge is not
See supra notes 31-33 and accompanying text.
280 See Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581, 603-04, 609 (1889).
281
Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 267 (1970) (citing Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S.
545, 552 (1965)).
282
See supra note 70 and accompanying text.
283
See8 U.S.C. § 1229(b)(1) (2000). While Arar was afforded five days to respond to
the removal order, the INA does not specify how many days he should have been given to
respond. See Deportation Order, supra note 6, at 3. While the Deportation Order refers to
8 C.F.R. § 235.8, there is no time requirement in that regulation; there is only a requirement that the alien be informed of his right to submit information for the Attorney General's consideration. See 8 C.F.R. § 235.8(a) (2007).
284
See, e.g., United States v. Five Gambling Devices, Labeled in Part "Mills," and Bearing Serial Nos. 593-221, Etc., 346 U.S. 441, 449 (1953).
279
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employed by an executive agency. Further, there are several provisions in Tide 8 that limit the ability of the BIA or an IJ to review decisions that the Attorney General has made; federal judges are less
restricted. 28 5 This would be similar to Canadian security certificate
proceedings-a process that prohibits judicial review-where the Canadian government must bring the case before a federal judge when it
is given the benefit of a truncated process. 28 6 Ultimately, an independent adjudicator could ensure that the Executive does not abuse the
287
benefits given to it under a truncated removal process.
While there should be an independent adjudicator in summary
removal proceedings, the U.S. government need not provide counsel
for an alien inadmissible on security grounds. The current U.S. removal process does not afford a nonresident alien the right to government-provided counsel because it is not a criminal proceeding; 28 8 nor
does the Canadian process afford such a right.2 8 9 Such a change in

U.S. law would not only increase the costs of providing a right of review but would also overturn a century's worth of precedent and practice. 290 The United States should allow aliens inadmissible on security
grounds to retain counsel if they can afford to do so, but the U.S.
government should not be forced to provide counsel at its own
expense.
However, although government-provided counsel is not required,
the U.S. government should have to provide an inadmissible alien
with the reason the alien's designated country for removal would
prejudice the United States, if the Attorney General decides to remove the alien to an alternate country. Even under the unconstitutional restricted Canadian security certificate removal process, the
foreign national is entitled to know the basis of his inadmissibility determination. 2 5 Thus, at the very least, the U.S. Attorney General
should have to provide a federal judge with evidence that proves removing an alien to the alien's choice country would prejudice the
United States and with evidence that establishes that the alien would
not face torture upon removal. 292 In turn, the judge should provide a
285 Compare 8 U.S.C. § 1225(c) (2000), with id. § 1252 (2000 & Supp. V 2005).
286
See supra notes 90-91 and accompanying text; see also Suresh v. Canada (Minister of
Citizenship & Immigration), [2002] 1 S.C.R. 3, 2002 SCC 1, para. 117 (Can.) (discussing
the procedural protections relating to the the issuance of such certificates).
287
See supra notes 27-28 and accompanying text.
288
See Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 594 (1952).
289
See supra notes 69, 97 and accompanying text.
290
See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
291
See supra notes 94-96 and accompanying text. Note however that this process will
likely change and the Canadian government will likely have to provide either more evidence or have their evidence stand up to independent scrutiny. See supra notes 93-94 and
accompanying text.
292
See supra notes 44, 46-53 and accompanying text.
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summary of this evidence to the alien. The need for such evidence is
supported by the statutory presumption that the alien's designated
2 93
country should be the preferable country for removal.
While not all of the evidence in support of the removal country
should necessarily be public, the federal judge's decision should be
published in a written record. Under Canadian law, foreign nationals
are entitled to a written record of their admissibility hearing decisions. 29 4 The U.S. judiciary should similarly be required to publish
the opinions produced in all summary removal proceedings. This requirement would ensure conformity within the Attorney General's office and among the circuits 295 and would also hold adjudicators
accountable to the Supreme Court. 296 This would not be a hard requirement to implement because most U.S. courts produce published
opinions.
The proposed changes articulated in this section would require
only modest amendments to the current removal proceeding. Fundamentally, they would require that an alien be afforded enough time to
meet with counsel and appeal the Attorney General's selected country
for removal. The other key change would be to require the Attorney
General to provide inadmissible aliens with at least one reason their
designated country of removal prejudices the United States. This
would not be a difficult process to implement, nor would it require a
large expenditure of resources. However, it would be a significant
step forward in protecting the due process requirements that all persons are entitled to under the Constitution.
CONCLUSION

In general, U.S. immigration law is a complex area that is hard to
understand, much less apply. However, the removal procedure for
aliens inadmissible on security grounds is even more difficult to apply.
U.S. law lacks the necessary procedural safeguards to protect due process rights, and U.S. courts have been unwilling to fill in the gaps.
More specifically, the U.S. Supreme Court's unwillingness to review
the Attorney General's decisions in immigration proceedings has created a legal vacuum where the rights of individuals such as Maher
Arar are lost.
In the case of removal procedures for aliens inadmissible on security grounds, Congress should refer to Canadian removal proceed293 See 8 U.S.C. § 1231 (b) (2) (2000) (presuming that an alien will select a country for
removal and providing that the alien should be removed there unless the limitation provided by the section applies).
294 See Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, 2001 S.C., ch. 27, § 169(b) (Can.).
295 See HenryJ. Friendly, "Some Kind ofHeafing," 123 U. PA. L. REv. 1267, 1292 (1975).
296 See id.
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ings to revise current U.S. law in order to ensure that aliens will not be
tortured upon their removal to a foreign country. To do so Congress
need only provide a statutory provision that ensures that the DHS
does not remove aliens from the United States before they are afforded the opportunity to appeal the country of their removal. This
does not mean that the courts must grant such appeals, it simply ensures the alien a reasonable amount of time to consider and pursue
an appeal. The courts then must be willing to evaluate these appeals
under a higher level of review to ensure that other aliens will not be
subjected to the torture Maher Arar faced. At this point, it is the least
they should do.

